Nonlinear price schedules generally have heterogeneous effects on health-care demand. We develop and apply a finite mixture bivariate probit model to analyze whether there are heterogeneous reactions to the introduction of a nonlinear price schedule in the German statutory health insurance system. In administrative insurance claims data from the largest German health insurance plan, we find that some individuals strongly react to the new price schedule while a second group of individuals does not react. Post-estimation analyses reveal that the group of the individuals who do not react to the reform includes the relatively sick. These results are in line with forward-looking behavior: Individuals who are already sick expect that they will hit the kink in the price schedule and thus are less sensitive to the co-payment.
INTRODUCTION
Nonlinear price schedules are a common feature of many health insurance systems. Nonlinearities often arise because of deductibles or combinations of co-payments and maximum out-of-pocket amounts. Economic theory predicts that these nonlinearities lead to heterogeneity in the effect of out-of-pocket expenditures on health-care demand even among individuals with identical preferences. In the presence of a nonlinear price schedule, heterogeneity arises as the out-of-pocket price is not the relevant price for forward-looking individuals. Instead, the relevant price depends on subjective expectations about future health-care use. For example, in a price schedule in which out-of-pocket costs drop to zero once they reach a certain amount, individuals who expect that they will exceed this amount have little incentive to reduce current health-care use -they expect to pay the same total amount independent of their health-care use today. Conversely, individuals who expect that their expenditures will not exceed the maximum amount face the full co-payment for their current health-care use. For forward-looking individuals, the sensitivity with respect to the current price of care thus depends on expected future health-care use, which naturally varies between individuals (Keeler et al., 1977; Ellis, 1986) . In the presence of a nonlinear price schedule, an average measure of price sensitivity might thus hide substantial heterogeneity, even after conditioning on observable variables, and might yield misleading policy conclusions.
In this paper, we develop a finite mixture model to analyze the changes in health-care demand induced by an introduction of a nonlinearity in the price schedule in the German statutory health insurance (SHI). The SHI is the public health insurance system in Germany that is mandatory for most employees and covers around 90% of the German population. The specific reform that we analyze introduced a per-quarter fee for doctor visits. Before 2004, the publicly insured in Germany did not have to co-pay for doctor visits. Since 2004, they have to pay a fee of C10 for the first visit to a doctor in each calendar quarter. Additional visits in the same quarter are free of charge. The price an individual pays thus drops from C10 to C0 after the first doctor visit in a quarter. Only individuals who do not visit any doctor in a quarter can avoid paying the fee.
In our analysis of this reform, we focus on the effect of the per-quarter fee on the probability of not visiting any doctor (henceforth, 'no doctor visit') in a quarter. The theoretical models of health-care demand by Keeler et al. (1977) and Ellis (1986) predict that this effect is heterogeneous across individuals as the per-quarter fee implies a nonlinearity in the price schedule. If individuals are forward-looking, their reactions to the per-quarter fee should depend on the subjective probability of having to visit a doctor. For individuals who expect that they will likely need to visit a doctor before the end of the quarter, behavior should not change. Other individuals, however, might expect that they can avoid going to the doctor through the entire quarter and thus avoid paying the fee. For these individuals, the probability of no doctor visit should increase. We therefore expect that there will be at least two groups with different reactions to the newly introduced per-quarter fee. We focus on the extensive margin (whether individuals see a doctor or not) to study whether the effect of the per-quarter fee confirms the theoretical predictions. We discuss possible effects on the intensive margin (how often they see a doctor) in the concluding section to this paper. This paper contributes to three strands of literature, as further explained in the following. First, the paper extends the literature on the introduction of the per-quarter fee by investigating heterogeneous effects. It thus is the first to explicitly take the predictions of the theoretical literature on the effects of nonlinearities in price schedules into account. Second, it contributes to the literature on the effects of nonlinear price schedules by introducing a finite mixture approach. This allows for an investigation of heterogeneous effects without having to estimate the unobserved relevant prices and without specifying expectations. Third, the paper adds to the literature on finite mixture models by specifying a model with two binary dependent variables and correlated error terms.
Earlier studies of the specific reform have abstracted from potentially heterogeneous treatment effects (Augurzky et al., 2006; Schreyögg and Grabka, 2010) . address measurement problems and nonlinearities that arise when using survey data to study the effects of a quarterly co-payment, but restrict the analysis to homogeneous effects. Rückert et al. (2008) stratify their results by observable characteristics and find that younger and healthier adults and individuals with low income are more likely to report that they have delayed doctor visits. Winkelmann (2006) studies the effects of a different reform of the German SHI using a quantile count data model; he documents heterogeneous reactions of the number of doctor visits to the reform, a result that is in line with the findings we report in the following.
We adapt and extend the model of Atella et al. (2004) to accommodate a bivariate binary outcome (indicators for visits to general practitioners (GPs) and specialists) and correlated error terms in a panel data setting. The finite mixture model allows us to estimate the sensitivity to changes in co-payments for different classes of individuals without having to specify a priori, which individual belongs to which class. We determine the number of different classes according to the normalized entropy criterion (NEC), a criterion which ensures that the classes are well separated and nonoverlapping. This criterion is rarely applied in economics although it provides a clear clustering structure, which enhances interpretation. For each latent class (LC) and combination of the bivariate binary outcomes, we calculate average marginal effects and their standard errors. We further calculate posterior probabilities of class memberships, based on which we assign individuals to LCs. We then examine the composition of these classes to describe the sources of heterogeneity.
Our empirical analysis uses administrative claims data from the largest German health insurance plan for the year 2002 to 2005. These data allow us to reliably observe doctor visits within quarters and are thus particularly suited for our purposes. However, they only contain information on health through diagnosis codes or claims for prescribed drugs. The latter two measures are, of course, only observed if individuals have visited a doctor. If the introduction of the co-payment affected the probability of doctor visits, it would also affect these health measures, which are thus endogenous to the reform. But health itself could be an important source of heterogeneity in the reform effects, for instance as current health status might explain individuals' expectations of their future health-care use. Our finite mixture approach allows us to omit the plausibly endogenous health measures from our main analysis, while still allowing for health-related heterogeneity through the model's LCs. We use the health measures only in a post-estimation analysis.
With this paper, we add to the literature on the price sensitivity of health-care demand. Many studies in this literature focus on the impact of the current out-of-pocket price on health-care demand without taking the impact of nonlinearities in the price schedule into account (see Aron-Dine et al. (2012) for a discussion and Einav et al. (2013) for a recent study that explicitly investigates incentives induced by nonlinearities in health insurance plans). A challenge in the analysis of the impact of nonlinear price schedules on the price sensitivity of demand is that individual expectations and thus the relevant prices are typically unobservable to the researcher. Using a finite mixture approach, we can account for heterogenous effects of the nonlinear price schedule without having to predict relevant prices and specify expectations. Furthermore, we do not need to make assumptions on the degree of forward-looking behavior. This is important as evidence by Aron-Dine et al. (2012) suggests that individuals are neither fully myopic nor fully forward-looking.
The finite mixture model we develop also fits into a recent literature on modeling heterogeneity in healthcare decisions and in the effects of reforms on individual behavior more generally. Examples include Deb and Trivedi (1997) , Deb and Trivedi (2002) , Atella et al. (2004) , Bago d'Uva (2006), Deb et al. (2011) and Ayyagari et al. (2013) who use finite mixture models to analyze heterogeneity in health-related decisions and outcomes, Winkelmann (2006) who develops a quantile model for count data to analyze heterogeneity in the effect of a different co-payment in the SHI, and Djebbari and Smith (2008) who extend and apply quantile treatment effects and random coefficient models to test for heterogeneity of the effects of a Mexican welfare program.
Our results indicate that the average probability of no doctor visit significantly increased after the reform, by about 3.5 percentage points, suggesting that the reform has had an effect on the demand for doctor visits on average. However, the average effect combines the price response of myopic as well as forward-looking consumers, and therefore does not provide the full picture. The estimates of our finite mixture model show that there are indeed heterogeneous reactions. We estimate models with two, three, and four LCs. According to the NEC, the model with two LCs is the most appropriate one. This model shows that for 36% of individuals the probability of no doctor visit increased by around 7 percentage points, while there was no significant change for the remaining individuals. Post-estimation analyses show that the individuals who react to the reform are the relatively healthy. To the extent that healthy individuals have lower expected future health-care needs, these results are in line with the theoretical predictions.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the data. We explain our estimation strategy and present the finite mixture model in Section 3. In Section 4, the results are reported. Section 5 concludes.
DATA
The analysis is based on insurance claims data from the largest German health insurance plan in the years 2002 to 2005. The data contain information on a 18.75% random subsample of all individuals -those with and those without health insurance claims -in the German state of Hesse who are insured with this health plan. At the beginning of each year, a refreshment sample is drawn in order to keep the sample representative of the insured population.
The main advantage of claims data is that doctor visits are reliably observed (whereas respondent self-reports in survey data are typically rather noisy). Specifically, for all visits, we observe the type of doctor visited, the diagnoses made (classified at the ICD-10 level), and the drugs prescribed. As we are interested in the reactions to the introduction of the per-quarter fee, we aggregate the data from the level of the doctor visit to the quarterly level (within individual). Furthermore, we group information on the different doctor visits into those to GPs and those to specialists. We then construct as dependent variables indicators for at least one GP visit per quarter and at least one specialist visit per quarter, at the level of the insured individual.
A disadvantage of this claims dataset is that it consists only of publicly insured individuals. It does not contain any adults who were not affected by the reform (primarily the privately insured) who could serve as a control group. Within the SHI, individuals younger than 18 years are generally exempt from paying the perquarter fee. These individuals, however, are not suitable as a control group for the entire adult population.
2 We thus exclude all individuals younger than 19 years from our analysis and revert to before-after comparisons to identify the effects of the reform in the adult population. Our results therefore rely on the assumption that at the same time as the introduction of the per-quarter fee, no other factors changed that affected health-care use systematically. Furthermore, using variation over time, we have to assume that no general time trends exist that lead to considerable changes in use over time.
The reform that introduced the per-quarter fee also implemented several other changes in the German Social Health Insurance System. The per-quarter fee, however, was the central and most radical element of the reform. The additional changes amounted to a change (and slight increase) in the way co-payments for prescription drugs were calculated, to increased possibilities for sickness funds to establish GPs as gatekeepers, and to offer specific programs to their enrollees, which rewarded healthy behavior, such as going to the gym or complying with vaccination guidelines, and a tightening of the rules for reimbursement of test-tube fertilization. While theoretically, these changes could affect health-care use, it seems unlikely that they had big impacts for several reasons. First, co-payments for prescription drugs existed already before the reform. The reform merely changed the way how these co-payments were calculated, with at best moderate increases of co-payments on average. Second, we only analyze data from one sickness fund. This fund did not introduce a gatekeeper model in our study period. It did introduce a bonus program in 2004. However, enrollment in bonus programs was overall very low Zok (2005) . Third, test-tube fertilization is only relevant for a very small group of individuals. Furthermore, as shown in Figure A in the Appendix, the term 'per-quarter fee' (Praxisgebühr) was searched for more than any of the other terms in 2004. Over time, the search volume for 'per-quarter fee' declined and was roughly on par with the search volume for 'in vitro fertilization' over the course of the year 2005. Given that in vitro fertilization is only relevant for a tiny part of the population, it is unlikely that this affects our results. Furthermore, the tightening of the reimbursement rules in 2004 led to a spike in in vitro fertilizations in 2003. If this had an effect on overall results, we should see spikes in doctor visits in 2003. We test this together with the plausibility of the assumption on the absence of general time trends by comparing changes in the probability of doctor visits across the two years prior to the reform.
Our sample is restricted to observations that cover an entire quarter. Observations are excluded, for example, if the individual switches from or to a different insurer during a quarter. This sample restriction ensures that the length of the period at risk is the same for each observation. Table I shows descriptive statistics for the third quarter of each year. 4 The average age is almost constant over time, reflecting the inclusion of refreshment samples. The average number of doctor visits is around 4.5 per quarter. On average, individuals visit a GP a little less than once a month and a specialist 1.7 times per quarter. This level of physician service use is high in international comparison, but it is in line with statistics on doctor visits in Germany available from other sources (Grobe et al. (2010) . While the average number of doctor visits per quarter does not change much after the reform, two possible effects of the increased co-payments become evident in Table I . Between 2003 and 2004 , the fraction of individuals with at least one GP visit and the fraction with at least one specialist visit in the third quarter both decline, from 63% to 60% for GPs and from 46% to 42% for specialists. Individuals thus seem to reduce contacts with either type of doctor after the reform.
As the co-payment can only be avoided by seeing neither type of physician, we are particularly interested in how the probability of no doctor visit within a quarter changed after the reform.
5 Descriptive statistics on these quantities are reported at the bottom of Table I . While in the third quarter of 2002 and 2003, roughly 27% of the sample visit neither a GP nor a specialist, this is the case for 33% of individuals in the years after the reform. The average probability of no doctor visit per quarter thus increases by about 6 percentage points after the reform. Figure 1 shows the probability of any doctor visit, separately for men and women with different health status. Health status is captured by the Charlson Index (Charlson et al., 1987) , which is based on 17 diseases identified from the diagnoses codes available in our dataset. Each disease is assigned a weight between 1 and 6, depending on its severity. 6 The Charlson Index is the sum of these weights, truncated at 2. A value of 0 thus indicates that an individual had no diagnosis of any of the Charlson conditions, and a value of 1 or 2 indicates the presence of one or more severe co-morbidities.
As the Charlson Index is based on diagnoses codes, which are only available if an individual has seen a doctor, the Charlson Index might itself have been affected by the introduction of the co-payment. In order to mitigate this problem, we construct the Charlson Index based on their diagnoses in the first and second quarter of 2002. For example, the 'Charlson 0' group contains all individuals who had no diagnosis of any Charlson condition in the first two quarters of 2002. Because individuals with conditions as severe as those counted in the Charlson Index will likely have to visit a doctor at some point during 6 months, we think that we can successfully detect most of the Charlson diseases. Furthermore, by focusing on the quarters prior to the reform our health measure is unaffected by the reform. Figure 1 presents first descriptive evidence of heterogeneous effects across the different groups. The probability of no doctor visit generally increases after the reform with similar magnitude for both genders. These increases are much smaller for individuals with a Charlson Index of 2 than for the other groups. Sicker individuals thus seem to react less to the reform than healthier ones.
Overall, Figure 1 indicates that the change in the probability of no doctor visit is stronger for healthy individuals. These results, however, condition on our descriptive measure of health. In order to test for heterogeneous reactions without having to rely on the health information in the claims data, we use a finite mixture model. This model allows us to estimate different effects for separate groups in the population without having to stratify the data by observable characteristics.
ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK
In this section, we develop a finite mixture model that accommodates a bivariate binary outcome and correlated error terms in a panel data setting. Our data consists of a panel of individuals observed over time and with outcomes related to two different medical specialties. Individuals can seek care from GPs (y 1 ) and/or specialists (y 2 ). Suppose there are J types (or classes) of individuals (j D 1; 2; : : : ; J ) who may react differently to the changing financial incentives. The number of different types J is determined by the data according to different selection criteria that are further explained at the end of this section. The object of interest is the change over time in the probability of visiting a doctor,
where j denotes the type, k refers to GP and specialists, respectively, and t is an indicator for years before (b) and after (a) the reform. In our application heterogeneous reform effects can, for instance, be caused by varying price sensitivities and/or differences in the perception of the price change. The latter is particularly important as some individuals may not react to the financial incentive at all because they consider the new co-payment like an insurance premium that they will have to pay anyway in order to receive the needed care. So even if their price sensitivity is negative, we might not see changes in the demand for health care in this group. The overall change in the probability of visiting a doctor for the population can be estimated from the group-specific reform effects as a weighted average across all groups
Reporting the overall effect is informative if the entire population is affected by the financial incentive. However, considering a case with a (possibly) large group that does not react to the reform at all, reporting the overall effect may hide even strong reactions in smaller groups. Equation (2) suggests the use of a finite mixture model to explore these heterogeneities. In the following, we give a formal description of the model and generalize the basic idea to the bivariate case incorporating correlated error terms and also additional control variables. Our model will, however, not account for individual fixed effects. Because our main coefficients of interest are the time dummies, this could be problematic if the fixed effects vary over time. However, a priori, there is no reason to believe that this is the case. Furthermore, when we estimate a linear probability model with fixed effects, we find slightly smaller but still significant reform effects than in the model without fixed effects.
8 Changes in unobserved heterogeneity over time are thus not driving reform effects in the linear probability model. In the finite mixture model, individuals are assigned to one LC for the entire study period. Thus, unobserved individual specific heterogeneity is accounted for better in the finite mixture model than in the simple linear probability model. We therefore judge it not necessary to include individual fixed effects in the LC model.
The dataset is an unbalanced panel, and each individual i is observed in T i quarters. Over time and across the two physician specialties, the dataset thus includes 2 T i observations for individual i. Suppose that individual i belongs to a LC j for the entire observational period. The probability of belonging to class j is j . Within a LC, we use bivariate probits to jointly model the decision to visit a GP and/or a specialist. While we are primarily interested in whether individuals visit any doctor within a quarter, there might also be an interest in the decisions to visit a GP and a specialist separately. Moreover, specialist visits often point to more severe health conditions. This information may be helpful to determine the LCs. We thus estimate a joint model with the two decisions, which in the presence of correlation among unobservables is more efficient than estimating separate models for the two binary choices.
The joint probability of the dependent variables over the observed period is the product of T i independent probabilities, given fixed class membership, that is,
OE.2y 1i t 1/x itˇj ; .2y 2it 1/x it j ; .2y 1i t 1/.2y 2it 1/ j
where x i denotes the vector of covariates that includes age, sex, seasonal fixed effects, and year fixed effects. 2 . / denotes the bivariate normal cdf and Â j contains the vector of parameters for GP visits (ˇj ), the vector of parameters for specialist visits ( j ), and the parameter j , which captures covariation of the errors in the underlying structural model.
While j allows for a correlation of errors in the probability to visit a GP and a specialist in each period conditional on type, we make the assumption that across time periods the probabilities are independent. This assumption is motivated by the idea that individuals have acute health shocks, which appear randomly over time conditional on type and only impact health-care use in the period in which they happen. Similar to a panel data model, the latent types capture type-specific heterogeneity that is constant over time. 9 The independence assumption of errors over time is thus less restrictive than it may appear. Furthermore, the assumption is not necessary in the linear probability model, in which we can explicitly allow for correlation in unobservables on the individual level over time by clustering the standard errors. As the results of a linear probability model are very similar to the overall effects in the finite mixture model, the assumption of independence of error terms across time does not seem crucial for our results.
10 Correlation of the probabilities to visit a GP and a specialist arises if the per-period health shock affects both types of doctor visits jointly.
The log-likelihood function that corresponds to this model is given by
where I is the number of individuals in the dataset and J is the number of LCs. In order to obtain a dataset of manageable size, we use a 3% random subsample in this part of our analysis. This gives us 120,521 observations from a little more that 7500 individuals per quarter.
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In order to facilitate the interpretation of our results, we calculate the average marginal effects of the variables in x i on P r.y 1i D 1jx i ; Â j / and P r.y 2i D 1jx i ; Â j /. Standard errors of the marginal effects are calculated using the delta method. As the reform effect is captured by changes in the probability of no doctor visit, we also calculate marginal effects on the probability of no doctor visit, that is, on P r.y 1i D 0; y 2i D 0jx i ; Â j /.
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Furthermore, using Bayes' theorem, we calculate posterior probabilities of membership in the different LCs for each individual i as P r y 1i ; y 2i 2 hjy 1i ; y 2i ;
where P r y 1i ; y 2i jx i ; b Â h Á is defined as in Equation (3). The posterior probabilities on the one hand help to judge how well the different LCs are separated, which is a basic objective of mixture models. On the other hand, one can assign individuals to a specific LC based on their posterior probabilities and then characterize each LC using observable characteristics. In addition to the variables age and sex that are included in x i , we use the health information contained in the data in this post-estimation analysis. As this information is not included in x i , it is external to the estimation and can therefore be used to verify the classification.
So far, we have not specified J , that is, the number of LCs in the finite mixture model. For model selection, information criteria such as the well-known Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) are often used. Both criteria emphasize the goodness of model fit but differ in their way how they take the parsimony of the model into account. However, these criteria do not reflect the model's ability to generate well-separated clusters -an important objective of mixture models. We therefore use a third criterion for model selection, the NEC. This criterion was proposed by Celeux and Soromenho (1996) to assess the optimal number of clusters in a mixture model. It determines the overlap of the mixture components; the smaller the overlap between different components, the better the separation between the LCs. The NEC is defined as
where t ij represents the posterior probability of class membership shown in Equation (5) and L. / is the likelihood function displayed in Equation (4), which depends on the number of LCs J . The entropy term in the numerator measures the overlap of the mixture components. A low value of the NEC therefore points to a model with well-separated clusters. Table II reports the NEC, AIC, and BIC criteria for the finite mixture bivariate probit model described in the last section with different numbers of LCs. In addition to finite mixture models with two, three, and four LCs, we estimate a standard one-component bivariate probit model. 13 The AIC and BIC displayed in Table II indicate that the model with four LCs fits the data best. The NEC criterion, on the other hand, prefers the model with just two LCs. As the criteria come up with conflicting results, we need additional guidance to choose between the models. While NEC indicates that the model with two LCs results in the optimal number of clusters, Figure 2 indicates that both models seem to do reasonably well in separating the sample into classes based on posterior probabilities. This figure plots the densities of the posterior probabilities of class membership for the models with two and four LCs. For both models, each probability has large spikes at 0 and 1, indicating that individuals can be easily assigned to LCs based on these probabilities.
RESULTS
Another aspect that is typically considered in the choice of the number of LCs in finite mixture models is interpretability of the different groups. Cameron and Trivedi (2005) , p. 624, argue that '[t]he most desirable situation is one in which the components have an interpretation'. Finite mixture models in health economics, therefore, often contain only two LCs, which are interpreted as the group of low or infrequent users and the group of high users of health care (see, for instance Deb and Trivedi, 2002; Bago d'Uva, 2006) . For the sake of interpretation, we therefore focus on the results of the model with two LCs, which is also favored by NEC. The results from the model with four classes do not differ qualitatively from the ones of the model with two LCs; see for details.
Marginal effects and their standard errors based on the results of our finite mixture bivariate probit model with two LCs are reported in Table III . In addition to the marginal effects in the different LCs, Table III displays overall effects, which are derived as weighted averages of the effects in the two LCs. The estimated prior probabilities of class membership, b and 1 b , serve as weights. For comparison, the last column of Table III reports marginal effects and standard errors based on the standard bivariate probit model. 13 Estimations with more than four latent classes failed to converge and are likely overparameterized. Figure 3 . Changes in the probability of no doctor visit
The overall marginal effects and the marginal effects of the standard bivariate probit model have the same signs and are similar in magnitude. Women have a higher probability of visiting a GP and of visiting a specialist at least once in a quarter than men. The probability of visiting a GP or a specialist at least once increases with age, particularly so for individuals aged 40 to 60 years. The probabilities of visiting either type of doctor at least once are lower in the summer months (quarter 2 and 3) compared with the first quarter of a year. Overall, the marginal effects thus show expected signs.
Of 14 The first two columns of Table III present the reform effects for the two LCs. The prior probability of belonging to class 1 is estimated as 62.5%. In this relatively large class, the changes in the probability of either doctor visit in the post-reform years are much smaller than in the other class. The results in Table III thus suggest that the reform had an effect on the demand for doctor visits and that this effect might be heterogeneous across individuals. However, recall that the per-quarter fee has to be paid at the first visit to a doctor in a quarter, independent of the type of doctor visited, while all additional visits to other doctors are free of charge. We thus present an analysis of the change in the probability of not visiting any doctor. The marginal effects on P r.y 1i D 0; y 2i D 0jx i ; Â j / are displayed in Figure 3 .
The overall effect displayed in Figure 3 8 percentage points. The results thus suggest that there is a group of individuals who changed their behavior after the reform while the behavior in the other group did not change. Naturally, the question arises who the individuals are that belong to the different LCs. Given the parameter estimates, we derive the posterior probabilities for each individual i and assign each individual to the LC with the highest posterior probability. Table IV reports averages of observed characteristics for the different latent classes. Besides age and sex, Table IV includes information on current health, as summarized by the Charlson Index, and on prescription drugs that individuals obtained from GPs and specialists, measured in defined daily doses (DDDs). 15 These give a rough measure of drug consumption within the different classes, adjusted for the fact that different drugs are of different potency. The DDDs do not take into account, however, which amount of the drugs were actually prescribed.
The last row of Table IV shows that about 64% of individuals were assigned to LC 1 and 36% to LC 2. Comparing the different LCs, it becomes evident that LC 1 is on average older than LC 2 and has a larger share of women. In addition, there are differences concerning the Charlson Index and the DDDs. Individuals in LC 1 have a higher average Charlson Index and higher average DDD. Individuals in LC 1 thus have more severe diagnoses and take more potent drugs on average, indicating that these individuals are sicker than individuals in the other LCs. This supports the hypotheses that among the individuals who do not react to the reform are the relatively sick.
Additionally, Table IV shows the fraction of observations in each LC that is exempt from co-payments. Before and after the reform in 2004, individuals could apply for an exemption from co-payments if the amount of their co-payments exceeded 2% of their gross yearly income. Welfare recipients and chronically sick individuals could be entirely exempt from co-payments before the reform. Since 2004, however, the 2% rule also applies to welfare recipients. The chronically sick can only be exempt from further payments within a year once they have already co-paid 1% of their gross yearly income. Individuals can apply for these exemptions already at the beginning of each year. In order to do so, they have to pay either 1% or 2% of their gross annual income up front. The information on whether individuals are exempt from co-payments is only available after the reform. The results in Table IV thus only include observations in the post-reform period.
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Given the exemption rules described earlier, one could argue that individuals who know ex ante that they will be exempt from all co-payments do not react to the introduction of the per-quarter fee. In line with this argument, Table IV shows that LC 1 includes a larger fraction of observations that are exempt from co-payments. However, 85% of observations in LC 1 are not exempt from co-payments and still do not react to the introduction of the per-quarter fee. The nonlinearity of the per-quarter fee thus results in heterogeneous reactions not only through exemption rules.
Overall, the results from the finite mixture model confirm that the introduction of the per-quarter fee in the SHI had heterogeneous effects: around 64% of individuals are assigned ex post to the class that does not react to the reform, while there are a strong reactions among the rest. Consistent with the theory of Keeler et al. (1977) , the results indicate that among the individuals who do not react to the introduction of the per-quarter fee are the ones who are sick and thus likely expect that they cannot avoid paying the fee.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present an empirical analysis of the heterogeneous effects of a nonlinear price schedule that was introduced in the SHI. The nonlinearity takes the form of a co-payment for doctor visits that only has to be paid for the first visit in each quarter of the year. The price for doctor visits individuals face in the remainder of a quarter drops to zero once the fee has been paid. Theoretical models of health-care demand in the presence of nonlinear price schedules suggest that the per-quarter fee changes the probability of no doctor visit differently across individuals. In particular, individuals who expect that they will need to visit a physician at some point within the quarter have a lower incentive to change their demand for doctor visits than individuals who expect that no visit is necessary. As expectations with respect to the necessity of visits within a given quarter likely depend on individuals' health status, the reform effect should vary between individuals with good and bad health.
In a descriptive analysis, we find that individuals in worse health react less to the reform than healthier individuals, independent of their age. Our measure of health, however, depends on the outcome variablenamely, it is observed only if individuals visit a doctor. We therefore omit this information from our econometric model and instead allow for unobserved heterogeneity by using a finite mixture model. The results of this model show that some individuals react to the reform while others do not. Characterizing the different groups indicates that those individuals who do not react are in worse health. Our results echo those of Winkelmann (2004 ) & Winkelmann (2006 on the effects of a different reform in the German health-care system, and they are in line with the theoretical predictions of how nonlinear price schedules affect the demand for medical care.
The finite mixture model does not allow us to determine the exact source of heterogeneity. In addition to heterogeneity related to forward-looking behavior, differences in health-care needs could be another source of heterogeneity as some individuals might not be able to avoid visiting a doctor due to their health status. Furthermore, heterogeneity in price sensitivities might also arise because of unobserved variation in income or due to preference heterogeneity, such as differences in the degree of myopia with some individuals taking future considerations into account in their decision-making and others not. As the intertemporal consequences of the German co-payment are salient and relatively easy to assess, however, it is likely that at least some of the heterogeneity that we document reflects forward-looking behavior.
Our analysis focuses on the reform's effect on the extensive margin of health-care use. As individuals might try to cluster additional visits in a quarter once they have paid the fee (Winkelmann, 2014) , a decrease in the probability of at least one visit in an average quarter does not necessarily translate into a decrease in the total number of visits. Consequently, our results do not pertain to the reform's effects on the overall number of doctor visits or on health-care costs. However, our findings allow two conclusions. First, the per-quarter fee affects the demand for doctor visits on average, indicating that this demand is sensitive to prices. Second, and more importantly, the effect on demand is heterogeneous across individuals and varies with individuals' health status.
Analyzing heterogeneous effects in this setting is important for two reasons. First, theoretical considerations suggest that average effects with nonlinear price schedules are not informative. Because of the nonlinearity in the price schedule, different individuals face different incentives. The average effect gives the result for the average incentive that nobody may actually face. Second, analyzing heterogeneities allows assessing the reform's consequences for specific, vulnerable groups. If average results show that individuals react to a reform, this need not imply that all individual react the same way. Some individuals might react a lot while others might react a little or not at all. Given that the goal of many health reforms -including the one we study in this paper (Deutscher Bundestag, 2003) -is to ensure high-quality health services and access to care for those in need, distinguishing the effects across different groups is crucial from a policy perspective.
